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Abstract: This paper examines the role of  subjective experiences in social philosophy and 
discusses it in relation to the critique of  poverty. The subjects of  poverty –the poor– and 
their stories can either be viewed as an essential voice in criticizing poverty or they can be 
viewed as flawed, distorted and misleading in contrast to 'objective' measures. I will discuss 
two different of  theories, the capabilities approach – developed by Amartya Sen –and the 
recognition approach– mainly associated with Axel Honneth. While Sen is reluctant to give 
the poor a saying in the evaluation of  their condition, Honneth, staying within the trade-
tion of  Critical Theory, views them as indispensable for social critique. So, both theories 
also bring forward different ideas how to understand and conceptualize normative theory. 
 




1. THE MORAL WEIGHT OF POVERTY 
 
During recent years, the problem of  worldwide poverty has become a thoroughly 
debated topic in philosophy. The discussion is complex and there is considerable 
disagreement about many issues such as questions concerning the ethical 
responsibility for the current situation and ethically demanded solution strategies. 
However, a widely shared understanding is that worldwide poverty is not only bad 
for the poor and to a minor extent also for the rich, but somehow morally wrong 
and unjust (Mack u. a. 2009). Within this realm of  conceptual and normative 
discussions, the capability approach of  Amartya Sen is an important player, while 
the recognition approach –closely connected to the works of  Axel Honneth– is 
another influential theory in social and political philosophy. Therefore, a reflection 
on the relationship between the capability and recognition approaches regarding 
their take on poverty is of  great value for the philosophical debate and for the 
wider frame of  poverty research. 
 
1.1 THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 
 
The central claim of  the capability approach as developed by Amartya Sen over the 
last three decades is that evaluations of  societal arrangements, quality-of-life 
assessments and judgments about justice or development should primarily focus 
on people’s capabilities, that is, on their real opportunities to lead the lives they 
have reason to value (Sen 1999; Robeyns 2005). In other words, the capability 
approach puts a focus rather on what people are effectively able to do and to be, 
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instead of  what they have or feel. This does not mean that income, happiness or 
commodities are not important in this perspective. But income and commodities 
are considered means to an end and therefore of  instrumental value only, while 
happiness is seen as one significant aspect of  human life among others that cannot 
be taken as the only evaluative category. 
 In the capability approach the availability of  certain substantial freedoms is 
judged as the most important aspect of  the life of  any person. The freedoms, e.g., 
to live a long and healthy life, to take part in the life of  the community, to receive a 
high quality education, to enjoy recreational activities, or to seek employment on an 
equal basis with others, are commonly seen as basic and it is demanded that they 
are made available to everyone. Since poverty is essentially defined by the absence 
of  such intrinsically valuable components of  a good human life, it is clear that it is, 
by definition, morally wrong. 
 Furthermore, capability theorists generally argue that human beings have 
the potential to live flourishing, meaningful and active lives according to their own 
values and shaped by their conceptions of  the good. Social arrangements primarily 
have the function to provide conducive conditions for each and every person to 
develop their faculties and to bring them into a position to act autonomously. If  
somebody is affected by poverty, her valuable choices are limited and her potential 
to realise her life plans is seriously restrained. In a situation of  serious capability 
deprivation it is not possible to act as an autonomous agent, which is considered a 
serious harm and even a fundamental violation of  the equal dignity of  all human 
beings. 
 
1.2 THE RECOGNITION APPROACH 
 
Axel Honneth has not developed thorough an answer to question of  poverty. This 
means that I have to reconstruct the key ideas of  the recognition approach and 
develop my answers from there (Honneth 1996; Honneth 2003). In summary, the 
recognition approach distinguishes three basic and universal forms of  recognition: 
(a) love, which manifests itself  in personal relationships and the feeling of  being 
accepted as a particular individual; (b) rights, which mean equal access to civil and 
social rights; and (c) social esteem, which is the ability to valuably contribute with 
one’s own talents and features. These different forms of  mutual recognition are 
viewed as the intersubjective conditions for the constitution of  subjectivity and 
identity and they enable individual self-realization, which is the core of  any  “good 
life”.  The denial or distortion of  recognition is experienced as subjectively 
harmful and is articulated in various ways, either individually or collectively. 
Suffering is therefore one major starting point and concern of  the recognition 
approach and this emphasizes its willingness to stay as close as possible to actual 
social conflicts and movements. If  someone lacks one or more of  these forms of  
recognition it is highly unlikely that she will be able to develop or sustain a positive 
self-relation and identify and pursue her own goals in life. 
 From this, I will formulate a recognition-based concept of  poverty that 
combines descriptive and normative features. Poverty is living under such 
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circumstances that are connected with feelings of  denigration and humiliation, as 
they do not allow the experience and gain of  socially prevalent forms of  
recognition and therefore hinder undistorted self-realization. Beyond the basic 
physiological and psychological needs all humans share, a further operationalisation 
and differentiation has to include empirical knowledge about the target society. In 
this sense, a recognition-based concept of  poverty combines absolute and relative 
elements. The general forms of  recognition –personal relationships, cognitive 
respect and social esteem– are universal but their concrete formation and 
embodiment is relative. It is important to stress that recognition can come in all 
different shapes and is not only about identity politics but also includes material 
and social forms such as income, housing or political participation. 
 So both the capabilities and the recognition approach emphasize the high 
importance of  personal freedom and view poverty basically as a limitation of  it. 
But the differences are equally important and one of  them is the role of  the 
subjects of  poverty. The poor and their stories can either be viewed as an essential 
voice in criticizing poverty or they can be viewed as flawed, distorted and 
misleading in contrast to “objective” measures. 
 
2. THE ROLE OF THE SUBJECT 
 
The role of  subjective experiences, feelings and emotions is highly debated within 
moral, social, and political philosophy. It is also an important topic within poverty 
research and in debates about adequate measures of  poverty and social exclusion. 
What role do and should such subjective experiences, feelings and emotions such 
as anger, shame, emotional distress or happiness and joy play, when it comes to 
measure and evaluate poverty? In most official surveys, whether from the 
European Union or from other national institutions, such subjective experiences, 
feelings and emotions are not indicators or necessary conditions of  poverty and 
social exclusion (Nolan und Whelan, 2011). They rather focus on monetary or 
material aspects such as deprivation, unemployment, basic commodities or 
capabilities. But there is a growing concern that this might be a major shortcoming 
and that the multidimensionality of  poverty and social exclusion also demands the 
inclusion of  such subjective criteria because they are an important part of  the 
experience of  poverty and social exclusion (Brock, 1999). The rise of  the debate 
about subjective well-being is also an indicator for this (McGillivray und Clarke, 
2006). What is certain is that poverty and social exclusion are in general connected 
with an impaired well-being and harmful feelings and emotions, although this is 
not true for everyone (Watson, Pichler, und Wallace, 2010). Finally, the role of  the 
poor themselves in the measurement and the conceptual approach of  poverty is in 
question. Do they know best or maybe better than the poverty researchers what 
poverty means or should mean? These questions arise also within normative 
spheres, when it comes to evaluating poverty. Do subjective feelings have or should 
they have normative weight and, if  so, how much? Is something morally wrong 
because it is felt as wrong or harmful? And what should we do with the long 
known cases in which people adapt to their living conditions and feel happy 
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although they should not? These problems of  alienation and the unreliability of  
subjective feelings and emotions are still unsolved and open for debate within 
normative theories. Neither poverty research nor normative philosophy is situated 
outside the real world, which is full of  relations of  power and domination. 
 
«A question remains: whose analysis and categories are to be privileged? 
These are largely “ours”, those of  professionals who are not ourselves 
poor, expressed in “our” language. The words, concepts, categories and 
priorities of  poor people, especially illustrated by the way they were elicited 
and expressed in the Voices of  the Poor, were rich and varied with com-
monalities. There are trade-offs to be puzzled over: between “their” 
realities and ours; between local participatory diversity and commensura-
bility for purposes of  aggregation; and between many categories represent-
ting poor people’s realities and fewer categories more manageable for 
outsider professionals and for measurement.» (Chambers, 2007, 38) 
 
Now, the recognition and the capability approach present different 
solutions or at least different perspectives on the role of  the subjective within 
poverty research and in the evaluation of  the moral significance of  poverty and 
social exclusion. And this different approaches also reflect different convictions 
about the nature of  normative reasoning in general. One is to give the subjects of  
poverty or any victims of  injustice a prominent role and articulate social critique 
from their perspective. The other one is to formulate a theory that explains the 
poor what is wrong about their condition and which therefore implies know a lot 
more about what is good and what is wrong. 
 For the recognition approach, as said, subjective experiences, feelings and 
emotions are a necessary condition that a condition is morally harmful and wrong. 
Although there are discrepancies about the exact role and weight of  such feelings, 
it is a major pillar which cannot be dismissed (Honneth, 2003; Pilapil, 2011). This 
leads back to the very roots of  the recognition approach, which comes from the 
tradition of  Critical Theory and further pursues the idea that social philosophy has 
to reflect social movements and take their claims seriously and as a starting point 
for normative explorations. So, subjective experiences, feelings and emotions, 
voiced by such groups and social movements as the labour class, women or black 
people from the beginning and the concern of  the recognition approach. Without 
this relation the critique of  the recognition approach would be artificial and 
without any audience. The recognition approach aims to not only hear the voice of  
the poor but to give it systematic weight. 
 
«To undertake an effective critique of  society one must start by taking into 
account instances of  injustice or violations of  standards of  justice. In 
contrast to its positive counterpart, the experience of  injustice possesses 
greater normative bite. As such, for Honneth, no experience of  injustice 
must be ignored even if  its public expression is fraught with danger and 
difficulty. This approach to social justice and normativity is typical of  the 
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Frankfurt School, which grounds the motivation for social resistance and 
liberation movements not on grand theories of  intellectuals but on people’s 
everyday experience.» (Pilapil, 2011, 81) 
 
This opens new possibilities for social critique and gives it more bite and 
weight, because it is not the critical theorist alone speaking but he or she articulates 
the suffering and critique of  the oppressed and the victims of  injustice themselves. 
This approach can also be used to detect injustices that otherwise would go 
unnoticed or would be misinterpreted by the distant critic. The poor are the real 
experts on the condition and without them many different dimensions, causes and 
consequences of  poverty would not be known. But the subjects of  poverty do not 
only know a lot about the negativity of  a harmful life but they also know a lot 
about the “good life” and what forms of  recognition are legitimate and what not.  
 
«I always introduce the conflicts and struggles of  capitalist social 
formations with reference to those principles of  mutual recognition that 
are considered legitimate by the members of  society themselves. What 
motivates individuals or social groups to call the prevailing social order into 
question and to engage in practical resistance is the moral conviction that, 
with respect to their own situations or particularities, the recognition 
principles considered legitimate are incorrectly or inadequately applied». 
(Honneth, 2003a, 157) 
 
Then again the capability approach has a more distant and critical relation 
to subjective experiences, feelings and emotions when it comes to their moral value 
and role in determining poverty and social exclusion. Sen is sceptical of  taking 
people’s subjective assessments of  their own situation as the defining feature of  
their well-being. They argue that individual desires, preferences or psychological 
happiness are malleable, susceptible to manipulation, adaptive to adverse circums-
tances and therefore of  limited usefulness for evaluational exercises. This is the 
case, it is argued, because the conditions people live in influence their perception 
of  their objective realities, and especially factors such as entrenched deprivation, 
social exclusion or predominant power structures within a society can contribute to 
individuals having a distorted picture of  their lives. Particularly in cultural contexts 
where social norms systematically disadvantage certain groups, even the notion of  
self-interest can become useless, as Sen demonstrates using the example of  women 
in rural India who have learned to subordinate themselves to other members of  
their family:  
 
«It has often been observed that if  a typical Indian rural woman was asked 
about her personal “welfare”, she would find the question unintelligible and 
if  she was able to reply, she might answer the question in terms of  her 
reading of  the welfare of  her family. The idea of  personal welfare may not 
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According to capability theorists, this adaptation problem clearly shows 
that social evaluations must transcend purely subjective measures (as used by 
utilitarians) and go in the “objectivist direction”. Otherwise, the real circumstances 
of  the disadvantaged members of  society are systematically misrepresented. As 
Sen puts it: 
 
«Consider a very deprived person who is poor, exploited, overworked and 
ill, but who has been made satisfied with his lot by social conditioning 
(through, say, religion, political propaganda, or cultural pressure). Can we 
possibly believe that he is doing well just because he is happy and satisfied? 
Can the living standard of  a person be high if  the life that he or she leads is 
full of  deprivation? The standard of  life cannot be so detached from the 
nature of  the life the person leads». (Sen, 1987, 7–8) 
 
Going in the objectivist direction means that the evaluative space of  well-
being must be expanded beyond any subjective metric and should include func-
tionnings and capabilities. By looking at this kind of  information in order to 
characterize the well-being of  a person, one gets the real picture of  a person’s 
circumstances and perceived misrepresentations of  social realities are avoided. 
That is to say, the consideration of  achieved functionings tells one exactly how a 
person is living and capabilities are best understood as an objective notion 
expressing the individuals’ general and specific freedoms to live the life he or she 
has reason to value. In other words, it is assumed that an increase in well-being 
always involves an increase of  important options to choose from. 
Despite this objectivization in the definition of  well-being and the rejection 
of  naive first person evaluations, the individual’s perspective is still highly valued in 
the capability approach. In Sen’s writings there is the background assumption that 
an expansion of  valuable capabilities is connected to a reduction of  the formation 
of  adaptive preferences in people’s values and desires and he is clear that in his 
opinion «[g]reater freedom enhances the ability of  people to help themselves and 
to influence the world, and these matters are central to the process of  
development» (Sen, 1999, 18). Therefore, in fair and conducive circumstances the 
desires and preferences of  persons indicate their “real” interests and they have to 
be taken seriously.  However, in the non-ideal world we live there are basically no 
“ideal” circumstances for an open and undistorted deliberation process. 
 The different approaches to the role of  subjective experiences are also 
present within the different methodologies and concepts within poverty research. 
The Participatory Poverty Assessment, for example, stands against distant 
descriptions and definitions of  poverty by so-called experts, which can be criticized 
for reproducing poverty themselves (Norton, 2001). Poverty research is seen as 
part of  the equation and not as an unrelated observer. Such approaches are also 
based on the conviction that we do not know what poverty is, without asking the 
poor themselves, and that poverty research can be a tool for empowerment. This is 
a position the recognition approach also favours, because it aims to take the 
experiences of  the disrespected, poor or excluded seriously and supports their 
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struggles for recognition (Lister, 2004). As shown, Sen is more critical of  such 
participatory approaches and his criticism is shared by many poverty researchers, 
who view the value of  subjective assessments as limited and advocate that they 
should at least be supplemented by other “objective” indicators. 
 
«There is a deeper problem about exclusive reliance on participatory 
methods, which goes back to Sen’s criticisms of  the utilitarian approach. 
People’s own assessment of  their own condition can overlook their 
objective condition, and can be biased as a result of  limited information 
and social conditioning (i.e., these methods also suffer from ‘‘valuation 
neglect’’). The generally public aspect of  assessments may also make it 
difficult to get honest assessments, and could involve participants in some 
risk.» (Ruggeri Laderchi, Saith, und Stewart, 2006, 40) 
 
 As these considerations indicate, a discussion between the capability and 
the recognition approach and their different weighting and integration of  
subjective experiences, feelings and emotions can be situated within a much larger 





Are there any lessons to be learned from the diverging arguments that the 
capability and recognition approaches offer, or could they benefit from each other 
in any way? 
 In both approaches one finds a nuanced characterisation and evaluation of  
poverty that is associated with (a) a set of  objective criteria necessary for the 
assessment of  poverty and (b) the recognition that these criteria are context 
sensitive and only applicable in a certain context if  the subjective experiences, 
feelings and emotions of  the persons concerned are given due weight.  
So far, the capability approach put a focus on (a) while the recognition approach 
was more concerned with (b). However, the both approaches are in many ways 
overlapping and can therefore also learn from each other. 
 On the one hand, it must be stressed that the recognition approach does 
not rely only on “the voices of  the poor” but also aims at justifying and 
empowering them. It tries to develop criteria that distinguish justified from 
unjustified forms of  recognition and makes use of  the category of  “undistorted 
self-realisation”. This notion is considered universally valid and serves as a 
foundation for the objective evaluation not only of  individual lives but also of  
social relations. On the other hand, the capability approach does not simply 
dismiss the knowledge and subjective experiences, feelings and emotions of  the 
poor. Their perspectives are taken seriously and considered indispensable for the 
definition of  valuable capabilities in a certain socio-economic context. Sabine 
Alkire, for example, has drawn on participatory tools and techniques in an effort to 
answer the question: «How do we identify valuable capabilities?» (Alkire, 2002). 
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However, an essential claim of  the capability approach is to make people critically 
engage with their experiences, feelings and emotions and to provide them with the 
material and immaterial resources necessary for it. 
 There is no “objective” way of  measuring and conceptualizing poverty as 
there is no way of  “objectively” defining justice or the “good life”, but still every 
theory needs a certain set of  normative claims that transcend the subjectivity of  





Alkire, S. (2002). Valuing Freedoms. Sen’s Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction. 1. 
Aufl. Oxford / New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Brock, K. (1999). It’s not only Wealth that Matters - It’s Peace of  Mind too. A Review of  
Participatory Work on Poverty and Ill-being. Washington: World Bank. 
Chambers, R. (2007). Poverty Research: Methodologies, Mindsets and Multidimensionality. 
Working Paper. Brighton: Institute of  Development Studies.  
http://www.ids.ac.uk/download.cfm?file=wp293.pdf. 
Honneth, A. (1996). The struggle for recognition: the moral grammar of  social conflicts. 1. 
Aufl. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
— (2003). Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser. In 
Redistribution or recognition?: a political-philosophical exchange, von Nancy Fraser und 
Axel Honneth, 110–197. 1. Aufl. London / New York, NY: Verso. 
Lister, R. (2004). A politics of  recognition and respect: involving people with 
experience of  poverty in decision-making that affects their lives. In The politics 
of  inclusion and empowerment, hg von. John Andersen und Siim Birte, 116–138. 1. 
Aufl. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mack, E.; Michael, S.; Stephan, K. und Thomas P. (Hrsg.) (2009). Absolute poverty 
and global justice: empirical data, moral theories, initiatives. 1. Aufl. Farnham / 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
McGillivray, M. und Matthew C. (Hrsg.) (2006). Understanding human well-being. 1. 
Aufl. Tokyo / New York, NY: United Nations University Press. 
Nolan, B. und Christopher T. W. (2011). Poverty and Deprivation in Europe. Oxford / 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Norton, A. (2001). A rough guide to PPAs: participatory poverty assessment: an introduction 
to theory and practice. Hg von. Overseas Development Institute (London, En-
gland). London: Centre for Aid and Public Expenditure  Overseas 
Development Institute.  
 http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/238411/ppa.pdf. 
Nussbaum, M. C. (2000). Women and Human Development – The Capabilities Approach. 
Cambridge / New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Pilapil, R. (2011). Psychologization of  Injustice? On Axel Honneth’s Theory of  
Recognitive Justice. Ethical Perspectives 18 (1): 79–106. 
Robeyns, I. (2005). The Capability Approach: a theoretical survey. Journal of  Human 
Development 6 (1) (März): 93–114. 
 
 
Astrolabio. Revista internacional de filosofía 
Año 2013 Núm. 15. ISSN 1699-7549. pp. 167-175 
 
175 
Ruggeri Laderchi, C.; Ruhi, S. und Frances S. (2006). Does it matter that we do not 
agree on the definition of  poverty? A comparison of  four approaches. In 
Understanding human well-being, hg von. Mark McGillivray und Matthew Clarke, 
19–53. 1. Aufl. Tokyo / New York, NY: United Nations University Press. 
Sen, A. (1987). The Standard of  Living: Lecture II, Lives and Capabilities. In The 
Standard of  Living. The Tanner Lectures,hg von. Geoffrey Hawthorn, von 
Amartya Sen, 20–38. 1. Aufl. Cambrige: Cambridge University Press. 
— (1990). Gender and cooperative conflicts. In Persistent inequalities: women and world 
development, hg von. Irene Tinker, 123–149. 1. Aufl. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
— (1999). Development as Freedom. 1. Aufl. New York, NY: Anchor Books. 
Watson, D.; Florian P. und Claire, W. (2010). Second european quality of  life survey: 
subjective well-being in Europe. Hg von. European Foundation for the Improve-
ment of  Living and Working Conditions. 1. Aufl. Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of  the European Communities.  
 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2009/108/en/1/EF09108EN.pd
 
